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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a), 63-46B-16, and 35-1-86. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are before the Court in this matter: 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission correctly concluded 
that under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45, Mr. Helf must prove 
that his injury arose out of his employment before 
compensation can be awarded. (Standard of Review: 
Correction of Error. Uintah Oil Assoc, v. County Bd. of 
Equal., 853 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1993).) 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission correctly found that 
Mr. Helf's injury did not arise out of his employment. 
(Standard of Review: Substantial Evidence. Hales Sand & 
Gravel. Inc. v. Audit. Div., 842 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 
1992) .) 
3. Whether the Industrial Commission correctly found that 
Mr. Helf failed to prove medical and legal causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence. (Standard of Review: 
Substantial Evidence. Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit 
Div., supra.) 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute is relied upon herein and is 
determinative of this appeal. 
UCA § 35-1-45: 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee 
who is killed, by accident arising out of and in 
the course of his employment, wherever such 
injury occurred, if the accident was not 
purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, and such amount for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, 
in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The 
responsibility for compensation and payment of 
medical, nursing, and hospital services and 
medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be on the employer and its 
insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This matter came before the Industrial Commission on an 
application for workers compensation benefits. It has been 
brought to this Court on Mr. Helf!s petition for review of the 
Industrial Commission's order denying benefits. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Helf filed an application for hearing with the 
Industrial Commission on January 6, 1993, requesting workers 
compensation benefits for an injury which occurred on 
September 9, 1992. (R. 1, 7). A formal evidentiary hearing was 
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held before the Honorable Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law 
Judge ("ALJ") on July 7, 1993. The ALJ entered his Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying Mr. Helffs 
application for benefits on August 12, 1993. (R. 54-59). 
Mr. Helf's motion for review was denied by the Industrial 
Commission on June 28, 1994. (R. 116-119). Mr. Helf then filed 
his Petition for Review with this Court. (R. 120). 
3* Statement of the Facts 
On September 9, 1992 Petitioner Lavell H. Helf ("Mr. 
Helf") was employed as a truck driver by Respondent Yellow 
Freight System, Inc. ("Yellow Freight") in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(R. 55). On that same day, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Mr. Helf 
arrived at Gates Rubber Company in Salt Lake City, Utah to pick 
up a shipment for his employer, Yellow Freight. (R. 55). 
While standing on the Gates Rubber Company loading dock, 
Mr. Helf bent over and pulled up on a metal ring which released a 
spring-loaded metal dock plate, causing the plate to raise and 
extend to the back of his trailer. (R. 55, 168). It took 
minimal exertion to pull the ring and release the dock plate 
(less than 2 0 pounds), and Mr. Helf did not have any problem 
pulling the ring. (R. 45-46, 55, 174-175). 
After pulling the ring, Mr. Helf walked onto the plate 
toward his trailer. (R. 168). While Mr. Helf was standing on 
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the plate, his hands went down to his sides (R. 4 3,45, 55, 160, 
179-180), he went rigid (R. 43, 55, 160, 179), jerked back (R. 
43,45, 55, 179), and fell straight back hitting his head on the 
flat cement floor of the loading dock. (R. 43,45-46, 55, 180). 
When Mr. Helf fell, he did not call out or make any other 
sound. (R. 44, 46, 55, 160, 180-181.) He did not attempt to 
break his fall with his hands. (R. 44, 46, 55, 160-161, 179-
181). He was unconscious before he hit the floor. (R. 44, 55, 
181-183, 201, 205-208; Exhibit D-l, pp. 118, 165). 
The dock plate on which Mr. Helf was standing at the time 
of his fall was only two inches higher than the surface of the 
loading dock. (R. 56, 172-174, 184-185). Mr. Helf was injured 
when his head hit the flat surface of the loading dock. (R. 43, 
46, 145, 180). 
For several years prior to the fall, Mr. Helf received 
medical treatment for a heart condition diagnosed as idiopathic 
hypertrophic subaortic stenosis. (R. 56, 190; Exhibit D-l, p. 
1A.) Mr. Helf's fall was caused by an idiopathic syncopal 
episode of unknown origin. (R. 56, 229; Exhibit D-l, pp. 139-
140, 358, ). The fall was not caused by an external cause 
related to the dock plate or by any other external cause such as 
tripping, slipping, etc. (R. 43, 46-47, 56, 161, 175-176, 180, 
206, 209, 228). 
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The syncopal episode which resulted in Mr. Helf's fall 
was not related to his pre-existing heart condition. (R. 56, 
229; Exhibit D-l, pp. 139, 358-360, 378). 
Mr. Helf's injury coincidentally occurred at work because 
of his idiopathic condition without any enhancement from the work 
place. Prior to and at the time of his syncopal episode and 
fall, Mr. Helf was not engaged in any activity which created any 
strain, exertion, or stress greater than that of his normal 
nonemployment life or the normal nonemployment life of any other 
person. His syncopal episode and injury did not result from any 
strain, exertion, or stress related to his employment. (R. 43-
44, 46, 56, 152, 158, 174-176, 195-198). 
Mr. Helf's employment did not contribute anything to 
increase the risk of injury that he or any other worker normally 
faces in everyday life. Neither the composition of the cement 
loading dock nor the fact that the dock plate was two inches 
higher than the dock floor increased the risk of injury that Mr. 
Helf or the average worker normally faces in everyday 
nonemployment life. Mr. Helffs employment did not increase the 
dangerous effects of his fall. (R. 43, 46-47, 56-57, 180, 209, 
299-230). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission correctly determined that 
Mr, Helf failed to meet his burden of proof and that his injury 
did not arise out of his employment as required by Utah Code Ann, 
§ 35-1-45. Moreover, Mr. Helf has failed to marshal the evidence 
which supports the findings made by the Industrial Commission, 
and which he challenges. 
When challenging a finding of fact made by an 
administrative body, appellate courts will not address the 
challenge unless the petitioner has properly marshalled the 
evidence. Marshalling the evidence requires listing all of the 
evidence supporting the finding that is challenged. Merely 
presenting carefully selected facts and excerpts of testimony in 
support of petitionees own position while conveniently omitting 
negative facts does not begin to meet the marshalling burden. 
The petitioner must fully assume his adversary's position and 
present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence which supports the very findings he resists. 
Having done so, the petitioner must then demonstrate that the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Mr. Helf has failed to even attempt marshalling the 
evidence in this case. He has merely reargued his case which was 
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made before the Industrial Commission. There is substantial 
evidence to support the Industrial Commission's findings. 
The Commission properly found that Mr. Helf was not 
engaged in any activity which created any strain, exertion or 
stress greater than that of his normal non-employment life. Mr. 
Helf suffered from a syncopal episode personal to himself which 
caused his fall and injury. Mr. Helf did not slip, trip or fall 
from any external cause related to his employment. Mr. Helf 
attempts to argue by implication that he was involved in moving 
heavy freight, but failed to demonstrate that at the hearing. 
Moreover, the medical evidence clearly established that stress 
and exertion were not the medical cause of Mr. Helffs syncope. 
The preponderance of the evidence at the hearing 
established clearly by eye witness testimony that the dock plate 
on which Mr. Helf was standing at the time of his fall was only 
two inches higher than the surface of the loading dock to which 
he fell. Mr. Helf provided no evidence that this two inch height 
contributed to his injury. Medical evidence submitted by the 
employer indicated that the additional height did not contribute 
to Mr. Helf's injury. Case law indicates that heights of only 
two inches are not sufficient to constitute an additional risk of 
the employment. 
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Mr. Helffs injury did not rise out of his employment. 
The fall itself was not caused by any risk increased by the 
employment, nor was the injury itself enhanced by the employment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 requires that an accident arise 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment. The 
statute was amended in 1988 to read as it does now. The employee 
bears the burden of establishing both of these elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
The term "arising out of" refers to the origin or cause 
of the injury in question. The injury must result from a risk 
incident to the employment. A risk common to the public 
generally and not increased by the circumstances of the 
employment does not cover a period. 
Idiopathic falls to flat surfaces do not provide the 
requisite employment related risk. A distinct majority of 
jurisdictions have denied compensation in level fall cases 
because the employee merely encounters the same risk, a flat 
surface beneath him, which he encounters everywhere. In Utah's 
idiopathic fall cases, the Supreme Court has required the finding 
that the employment places the employee in a position increasing 
the dangerous effects of the fall, such as on a height, near 
machinery or sharp corners, or in a moving vehicle. Cases from 
other jurisdictions with essentially identical facts to those in 
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this case have found no additional risk from the employment due 
to the flat surface. Courts have also held that falls from 
heights below certain levels do not constitute a sufficient risk 
that is unique to the employment. Falls less than 12^ inches 
have routinely been held insufficient. 
The hardness or softness of the surface to which an 
employee falls in a level fall case does not constitute a special 
risk of employment. Several cases involving falls to cement 
floors have found no added special risk from the employment. 
The unexplained fall theory is unapplicable in this 
matter. A fall which is caused by a syncopal episode is not an 
unexplained fall. This is true even if the exact reason for the 
syncopal episode is unknown. Falls which are witnessed and which 
witnesses describe as unrelated to any external factor are not 
unexplained falls. They are falls due to reasons personal to the 
employee, and are not compensable. 
Unexplained falls in Utah would still require the 
employee to bear the burden of proving that the fall occurred 
because of some risk inherent in the employment. Petitioner has 
utterly failed to demonstrate through witness testimony or 
medical evidence that any reason unique to the employment caused 
his fall or increased the injury resulting from the fall. In 
fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Mr. Helf has failed to 
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meet his burden of proof, and the findings and the conclusions of 
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
The order of the Industrial Commission should be 
affirmed. It correctly determined that Mr. Helf failed to meet 
his burden of proof and that his injury did not arise out of his 
employment as required by UCA 35-1-45. Moreover, Mr. Helf has 
utterly failed to marshall the evidence which supports the 
findings made by the Industrial Commission which he challenges, 
and has misstated certain evidence received below. This brief 
first addresses Mr. Helf's failure to properly marshall the 
evidence. It then addresses why, in light of all of the 
evidence, the Industrial Commission was correct in concluding 
that Mr. Helffs injury did not arise out of his employment. 
I. MR. HELP HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, AND HAS 
MISSTATED EVIDENCE RECEIVED BELOW. 
When challenging a finding of fact made by an 
administrative body, appellate courts will not address the 
challenge unless the petitioner has properly marshalled the 
evidence. Robb v. Anderson. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 
1993). The marshaling requirement "*serves the important 
function of reminding the litigants and appellate courts of the 
broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial.1" Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991), quoting State v. 
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Moore, 801 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990). A proper marshaling 
is required to provide the Court of Appeals with the basis from 
which to meaningfully and expediently review facts challenged on 
appeal. Robb v. Anderson, 863 P.2d at 1328. Marshaling relieves 
the court's burden of researching the record, reminding the 
petitioner that the court "is not simply a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah App.), cert. 
granted. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1993). 
Marshaling the evidence requires listing all of the 
evidence supporting the finding that is challenged. Alta Indus. 
Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). Merely 
presenting carefully selected facts and excerpts of testimony in 
support of petitioner's own position, while conveniently omitting 
negative facts, does not begin to meet the marshaling burden. 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992). 
Obviously, incorrectly stating "facts" in order to improve one's 
position is inappropriate. State v. Piling, 875 P.2d 604, 608 
(Utah App. 1994); Johnson v. Board of Review, 842 P.2d 910, 912 
(Utah App. 1992). The purpose of the marshaling process was set 
forth clearly by this Court: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the 
devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate himself 
or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to 
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properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret 
out a fatal flaw in the evidence. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App. 1991) (emphasis added). 
In appeals from the Industrial Commission, a party 
challenging the Commission's factual findings must marshal all of 
the evidence supporting the Commission's findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts, and all legitimate inferences that 
can be drawn therefrom, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence given the record as a whole. The Court must 
view the facts and all legitimate inferences in the light most 
favorable to the Commission's findings. Hales Sand & Gravel, 
Inc. v. Audit Div., 842 P.2d 887, 890-893 (Utah App. 1992). 
Substantial evidence is "that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind 
to support a conclusion." First National Bank v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). Substantial 
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but is 
something less than the weight of the evidence. Johnson v. Board 
of Review, 842 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah App. 1992). A reviewing court 
"does not conduct a de novo credibility determination or reweigh 
-12-
the evidence." Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 850 
P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Nor does a reviewing court 
substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting 
views, even though it may have come to a different conclusion had 
the case come before it for de novo review. Albertsons, Inc. v. 
Department of Emp. Sec.. 854 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah App. 1993).x 
Mr. Helf has failed to even attempt marshaling the 
evidence which supports the findings he challenges. He has done 
nothing more than reargue his case which was unsuccessfully made 
to the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission. 
He has conveniently omitted evidence and facts which are contrary 
to his position. He has also misstated the evidence. As is 
demonstrated below, there is indeed ample evidence to support the 
Industrial Commission's findings under the substantial evidence 
standard. 
The date and location of the injury are undisputed. The 
Commission found that prior to and at the time of his syncopal 
episode and fall, Mr. Helf was not engaged in any activity which 
created any strain, exertion, or stress greater than that of his 
normal nonemployment life or the normal nonemployment life of any 
lnIt is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to 
resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inference 
can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw 
the inferences." Albertsons. 854 P.2d at 575. 
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other person. His syncopal episode and injury did not result 
from any strain, exertion, or stress related to his employment. 
(R. 56). Mr. Helf argues that this is not true. However, 
substantial evidence supports this finding that there was no risk 
special to Mr. Helf's employment. 
Both eyewitnesses to the event testified that prior to 
the fall, Mr. Helf appeared normal. It was at this time that 
Mr. Helf moved some freight in his trailer, pulled the pin to 
release the dock plate, walked on the plate, and stopped just 
before he fell. Witness James Childs stated, in response to the 
question whether Mr. Helf appeared to be having any difficulties 
or problems, that "No. He seemed to be as sharp as the fifty 
times I'd seen him before that." (R. 152). He later testified 
that just before Mr. Helf walked over to pull the pin, he "seemed 
fine" and did not appear tired or stressed, (R. 158). 
Mr. Helf alleges in his brief that just prior to pulling 
the pin for the dock plate, he was moving around stoves weighing 
1279 pounds and fiberglass grating weighing 200 pounds. 
(Petitioner's brief, p. 7). However, there was absolutely no 
testimony or evidence provided at the hearing to establish what 
Mr. Helf moved. Nick Valles, the witness who entered the trailer 
with Mr. Helf and actually assisted him in moving whatever they 
moved, stated that "he had some awkward objects in there and I 
-14-
had to move a couple of objects, pieces of freight, and then I 
came back out and he followed me and I jumped on my lift and was 
ready to load him and that's when he went to go pop the plate and 
go into the trailer." (R. 166). This witness also said he 
"helped him kind of make some room" and "just needed to help him 
move them" and that the pieces were "kind of heavy, but they were 
more awkward." (R. 166). 
At the hearing, Mr. Helf submitted a freight manifest 
into evidence which described the items in his trailer. There 
was absolutely no testimony or evidence regarding what object or 
objects among these items were moved, or how or where any object 
was moved (i.e., lifted, pushed, pulled, etc.). There was no 
testimony regarding the weight of any object that was moved or 
how the witness helped Mr. Helf. If the witness and Mr. Helf 
moved an object together, there was no testimony regarding how 
any weight was distributed between them, whether Mr. Helf had any 
difficulty moving an object, or whether the activity created any 
strain, exertion, or stress greater than that experienced in the 
normal nonemployment life of any other person. In fact, the 
witness who assisted Mr. Helf agreed that it did not create any 
such stress. 
Q. When Mr. Helf—you helped him move some 
awkward freight you indicated in the 
back of the trailer, he didn't appear 
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overly stressed or tired from moving 
that freight did he? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Just appeared normal to you didn't he? 
A. Yeah. He did. 
(R. 176). 
Mr. Child testified that Mr. Helf did not appear to be 
struggling to pull the pin to release the dock plate. (R. 159). 
Witness Nick Valles testified that pulling the pin to release the 
dock plate is fairly easy, and that as an employee of Gates 
Rubber Co. he is familiar with its dock plates and how easy it is 
to pull the pins. (R. 174). 
Q. Okay. Now, tell me about the plate 
itself as far as pulling the pin. Is it 
a fairly easy pin to pull? 
A. Yes. It is. 
Q. And as an employee of Gate's Rubber, 
you're familiar with the equipment 
there and how easy it is to pull those 
pins; is that right? 
A* Yes. 
Q. And when Mr. Helf pulled the pin that 
day, did he appear to have any unusual 
difficulty or any problem pulling the 
pin? 
A* Not that I knew of. 
Q. And if you're going to put any kind of 
a weight, how much force it takes to 
pull the pin, would you say its ten 
pounds, maybe? 
A. Ten, fifteen, twenty. It's not—you know, its 
pretty easy. 
Q. Not very much? 
A. Not very much. 
Q. Okay. And when you saw Mr. Helf that 
day and you talked to him before he 
even went into the trailer; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. He didn't appear to be overly stressed 
or fatigued to you, did he? 
A, Not that I know of. 
Q. Okay. He appeared just normal to you 
on that day, didn't he? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he appear to be hurried at all any 
more than normal? 
A. No. It didn't seem like it. 
(R. 174-175). Mr. Valles' testimony at the hearing was 
consistent with his statement taken immediately after the injury, 
where he stated that there was no indication of any problems with 
Mr. Helf that day, and that he "seemed like he was normal" and 
"he seemed pretty normal to me." (R. 46). Mr. Valles also 
indicated in his statement that the dock plate was "very easy to 
pop up" and that Mr. Helf didn't have any problem pulling up the 
pin, "no problem at all." (R. 46). Mr. Valles also signed a 
sworn affidavit confirming his statement: 
Mr. Helf did not appear to have any problems 
pulling the metal ring to release the dock plate. 
The ring is very easy to pull up, and Mr. Helf 
had done it on many prior occasions. 
(R. 42-44). 
Mr. Helf states in his brief that "it is the weight of 
the person, walking the dock plate down onto the trailer, which 
actually forces the plate down. That a 175 pounds [sic] person 
does not weigh enough to force the plate down and must push 
against a wall for extra leverage to force the plate down into 
the trailer." (Petitioner's brief, pp. 4, 18.) Mr. Helf then 
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argues that "that [dock] plate was spring loaded and would 
automatically return into its non-use position unless Mr. Helf 
immediately walked onto it. A person who weighed 175 pounds 
could not force that plate down without using a "wall" as 
additional leverage to force that plate down." (Petitioner's 
brief, p. 19.) Mr. Helf's misstatements may mislead the Court. 
The allegations are not relevant to any finding or conclusion of 
the Industrial Commission. The record indicates clearly that it 
was the witness, James Childs, who weighed 175 pounds and that it 
was the witness who had to "push on the wall a little bit to get 
it to come down all the way." (R. 151). Mr. Helf weighed 
approximately 200 pounds at the time of the accident, (Exhibit D-
1, p. 138), and the undisputed testimony from Mr. Helf's own 
witness was that Mr. Helf's weight brought the plate down and Mr. 
Helf did not push on any walls on the date of injury. (R. 17 5-
176). Thus, the evidence regarding the travail of the 175 pound 
man is entirely meaningless, and can only serve to mislead the 
Court as to the facts. 
Clearly, the evidence supports the finding of the 
Administrative Law Judge, adopted by the Industrial Commission, 
that Mr. Helf did not engage in any strain, exertion or stress 
greater than that of his normal nonemployment life. Moreover, 
contrary to the allegation in his brief at pages 5 and 6, Mr. 
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Helf submitted no medical evidence whatsoever that his syncopal 
episode was related to or caused by his alleged exertion or his 
work. In fact the medical evidence was to the contrary. 
Several doctors expressed the opinion that electro-
physiologic stress tests performed following the accident did not 
create any syncopal episode or heart problems. With the 
exception of Dr. Sochanski, all of the medical opinions submitted 
into evidence at the hearing concluded that Mr. Helffs syncopal 
episode was not related to his pre-existing heart condition. Dr. 
Null and Dr. Speed ruled out heart-related causes based upon the 
electro-physiologic stress studies conducted by Dr. Freedman. 
(Exhibit D-l, pp. 139-140, 358-359). 
Dr. Sochanski expressed the opinion that Mr. Helf's 
syncope was a natural incident of his pre-existing heart problem, 
but confirmed that it was not related to any stress or exertion 
at his employment. (Exhibit D-l, pp. 1A-1C). 
Dr. Null stated in correspondence dated December 3, 1992, 
just three months after the accident, that ". . .an arrhythmia 
was not the cause of his fall and subsequent head injury." 
(Exhibit D-l, p. 140) . After the hearing in which the case was 
dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge, Mr. Helf provided the 
Industrial Commission with another letter from Dr. Null, dated 
June 30, 1993, wherein Dr. Null, without any reference to his 
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previous opinion, expressed just the opposite opinion. (R. 51). 
Mr. Helf refers to this letter in his brief at page 5. The 
Commission may reject medical testimony if it is self-
contradictory, inconsistent with other testimony, or directly 
impeached. Crittendon v. City of Butte. 559 P.2d 816, 817 (Mont. 
1977); Mustard v. Industrial Comm'n of Arizona. 792 P.2d 783, 784 
(Ariz. App. 1990). Clearly, the two opinions are self-
contradictory and no explanation is offered for the change in 
opinion or the conclusion reached in the second letter. 
In spite of the fact that his own stress test had ruled 
out a relationship between physical exertion and Mr. Helf's 
syncopal episode, Dr. Freedman provided a letter which Mr. Helf 
submitted after his claim was dismissed by the ALJ. (R. 50). 
Therein, Dr. Freedman opines that if the syncope was related to 
Mr. Helffs cardiac condition, it was "likely related to whatever 
level of exertion was present at the time." However, his own 
studies had previously determined that the syncope was not 
related to Mr. Helf's cardiac condition. (R. 50). Far from 
being evidence of medical causation, this letter suggests that 
the syncopal episode would have occurred whatever the applicant 
would have been doing on the day of the accident. Dr. Freedman's 
letter is based on vague generalities, and is not supported by 
any tests specifically performed on Mr. Helf. It was Dr. 
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Freedman's own tests on Mr. Helf that prompted Dr. Hull and Dr. 
Speed to rule out heart related causes. 
To the extent that any of the physicians stated that the 
injury was related to Mr. Helffs work, the physicians were 
misstating the law. For example, Dr. Heilbrun stated that "It is 
my opinion that this patient sustained a head injury while 
performing his duties at work. On this basis alone the injury 
must be considered work related." (Ex. D-l, p. 379). As will be 
discussed below, U.C.A. § 35-1-45 requires that an injury both 
1) occur in the course of employment and 2) arise out of the 
employment. These are two distinct elements, and both must be 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence for a claim to be 
accepted. Walls v. Industrial Commfn of Utah, 857 P.2d 964, 967 
(Utah App. 1993). Clearly Dr. Heilbrun did not understand the 
appropriate legal standard, and is not qualified in any respect 
to make such a legal conclusion. 
Based on the medical evidence submitted at the hearing 
and after, the Industrial Commission found that Mr. Helffs fall 
was caused by an idiopathic syncopal episode of unknown origin 
and was not related to his pre-existing heart condition. 
Regardless of how much stress Mr. Helf claims he was under, the 
physical stress tests by Dr. Freedman ruled out a relationship 
between exertion and the syncopal episode. Moreover, Mr. Helf 
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provided no medical evidence to indicate that his syncopal 
episode was medically caused by physical exertion or stress. In 
order to meet his burden of showing medical causation, "the 
applicant must show by evidence, opinion or otherwise that the 
stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation led 
to the resulting injury or disability." Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n.. 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). Mr. Helf failed to meet 
his burden by a preponderance of the evidence, and the Industrial 
Commission ruled with the weight of the evidence. Thus, the 
finding of the Industrial Commission is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
There is substantial evidence to support the Industrial 
Commission's finding that Mr. Helf fell because of a syncopal 
episode of unknown origin. (R. 55). Both eyewitnesses testified 
that when Mr. Helf fell, he did not call out or make any other 
sound. (R. 160, 180-181). Witness Nick Valles1 testimony to 
that effect concurred with his previous statement and affidavit. 
(R. 44, 46). The two eyewitnesses also testified that Mr. Helf 
did not attempt to break his fall with his hands. (R. 160-161, 
179-181). He stopped, went rigid, his hands went to his sides, 
he jerked back and fell straight back to the floor. (R. 43, 45-
46, 160, 179-180). Again, the earlier statement and affidavit of 
Nick Valles concurred. (R. 44, 46). Mr. Valles also testified 
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that Mr. Helf appeared unconscious before he hit the loading 
dock. (R. 44, 181-183, 201, 205-208). 
The medical records also state clearly that Mr. Helf 
suffered a syncopal episode that caused him to fall. (Exhibit D-
1, pp. 118, 165, 207). Mr. Helf had a history of spontaneous 
syncopal episodes, (Exhibit D-l, pp. 225, 278), as the Industrial 
Commission correctly noted. (R. 116). As demonstrated by the 
cardiac electro-physiologic studies performed by Dr. Freedman and 
evaluated by Dr. Speed and Dr. Null, physical stress and exertion 
were not related to Mr. Helf's syncopal episode. (Exhibit D-l, 
pp. 139-140, 358-359). Thus, there is substantial evidence from 
witnesses and medical authorities to support the Industrial 
Commission's findings that Mr. Helf fell because of a syncopal 
episode of unknown origin. 
The Industrial Commission correctly determined that Mr. 
Helf did not slip, trip or fall from any external cause, 
including the dock plate. (R. 56). This was supported by 
undisputed testimony of both eyewitnesses at the hearing and 
through affidavit testimony. Nick Valles stated in his affidavit 
that "[i]t did not appear to me that Mr. Helf's fall was caused 
by a slip or trip or any other external cause." (R. 43). His 
testimony at the hearing confirmed this fact: 
Q. Now, he didn't slip on anything did he? 
A. No. 
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Q. You didn't see him slip at least? 
A. No. 
Q. And you didn't see him catch his toe or 
trip or anything? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anybody push him or did any freight 
fall on him to cause him to fall? 
A. No. 
(R. 180). Witness James Childs also stated that "No one pushed 
him, that's for sure" and "No freight fell on him." He also 
testified that he did not have "the faintest idea" what caused 
Mr. Helf to fall. (R. 161). In addition, Dr. Barbuto provided 
his medical opinion that "when a person falls in the manner 
described by the witness to Mr. Helf's fall, the implication is 
that the fall was due to a medical condition personal to Mr. 
Helf. The incline of the plate would not have contributed to a 
fall in this manner." (R. 47). Mr. Helf claims in his brief 
that he "fell backwards while walking the metal dock plate onto 
his trailer." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 5). The evidence was to 
the contrary. Mr. Valles testified in his affidavit that the 
fall was not caused by any external cause. (R. 43). He 
testified at the hearing that Mr. Helf stopped walking before his 
hands went to his sides and before he went rigid and fell. (R. 
179). The other eyewitness, James Childs, also testified that 
before Mr. Helf fell he stopped walking. (R. 159-160). There was 
no testimony from any witness, any physician or any other source 
to support Mr. Helf's contention that the dock plate or its angle 
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or Mr. Helf's actions somehow contributed to or exacerbated the 
effects of his fall. 
Mr. Helf complains that the Industrial Commission erred 
in finding that the minimal elevation of the plate constituted no 
special or enhanced risk from the employment. The Commission 
correctly found that the dock plate was only two inches higher 
than the surface of the loading dock at the time of Mr. Helf's 
fall. (R. 56, 116). Nick Valles testified at the hearing that 
his prior statement and affidavit testimony were correct. 
Q. (By MR. McCONKIE) The question was, 
from the concrete then the plate would 
be about six inches high, or lower? 
Your response was about two inches; is 
that your recollection? 
A. Well, when the plate goes down. 
Q. The plate was about two inches higher 
than the concrete— 
A. When he fell back. 
Q. When fell back? 
A» Yes. 
(R. 174). (See also R. 185). The testimony of the other witness 
at the hearing was that the difference in height was a few inches 
higher, (R. 161), but the Administrative Law Judge gave more 
weight to the testimony of Mr. Valles and its consistency with 
his statement taken immediately following the accident. (R. 
229). The finding that the plate was two inches higher than the 
loading dock is therefore supported by substantial evidence. 
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Regardless of the height of the dock plate, Mr. Helf 
provided no evidence that the height contributed to his injury. 
Dr. Barbuto opined to the contrary, that the additional height of 
the plate did not contribute in any measurable degree to Mr. 
Helf's injury. (R. 47). Thus, the only evidence on this issue 
supports the finding of the Industrial Commission. 
Finally, the Industrial Commission correctly found that 
the composition of the cement loading dock did not increase the 
risk of Mr. Helf's injury. Mr. Helf submitted virtually no 
medical evidence on this issue other than an obscure statement 
that Mr. Helf's "outcome may have been different, had the patient 
struck his head on a surface other than concrete." (Exhibit D-
1, p. 360). This statement can mean nearly anything, including 
that Mr. Helf's injuries might have been worse had he struck his 
head on a surface of featherbeds. The statement adds nothing to 
the record and certainly does not approach satisfying Mr. Helf's 
burden of proof. 
In the face of this lack of affirmative evidence is the 
well-accepted rule that courts have refused to find that cement 
floors constitute an added risk peculiar to the employment.2 
2See, e.g. Zuchowski v. U.S. Rubber Co., 229 A.2d 61 (R.I. 
1967). This principle is discussed in detail in a subsequent 
section of this brief. 
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Thus, the Commission's finding is supported by substantial 
evidence and as a matter of law. 
Mr. Helf has failed to make even a veiled attempt to 
marshal the evidence in support of the Industrial Commission's 
findings. Apparently this is because there is in fact 
substantial evidence to support each of those findings. The 
Court should not consider Mr. Helf's challenges to the findings 
of fact because of his failure to marshal the evidence and show 
that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. The 
findings of the Industrial Commission should be accepted. 
Johnson v. Board of Review. 842 P.2d at 912. 
II. MR. HELP'S INJURY DID NOT ARISE OUT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
WITH YELLOW FREIGHT. 
The Industrial Commission properly determined that Mr. 
Helf's injury did not arise out of his employment with Yellow 
Freight. The fall itself was not caused by any risk increased by 
the employment, nor was the injury itself enhanced by the 
employment. The order of the Industrial Commission should 
therefor be affirmed. 
Utah's worker's compensation statutory scheme requires 
that an applicant establish that his injury arose out of and in 
the course of his employment. UCA § 35-1-45 (emphasis added). 
The applicant has the burden of establishing by a preponderance 
of the evidence that there is a special risk peculiar to the 
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employment which caused or substantially contributed to cause the 
injury. Where the case involves an idiopathic fall to a flat 
surface, the majority of courts have consistently found that 
there is no risk arising out of the employment, and therefore no 
worker's compensation benefits are provided. Falls from short 
heights up to at least 12 inches are also not sufficient to 
create a risk from the employment. Moreover, the hardness or 
softness of the surface to which the applicant falls is not 
considered in determining whether there is an added risk special 
to the employment. Because applicant's fall was the direct 
result of an idiopathic condition, and because he fell to a 
surface only two inches below where he was standing, applicant's 
injuries did not arise out of his employment. 
A. Mr. Helf Failed To Prove The Existence Of A 
Risk Or Hazard Special To His Employment. 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-45 states clearly that an 
employee is entitled to compensation under the Act only if he is 
injured "by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment . . . " (emphasis added). The statute was amended in 
1988, as quoted, to require that an accident both (1) occur in 
the course of employment, and (2) arise out of the employment. 
In order to establish a claim for benefits, the applicant bears 
the burden of establishing both of these elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. D.H. Perry Estate v. Industrial 
-28-
Comm'n of Utah. 7 P.2d 269 (Utah 1932); Hialey v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 285 P. 306 (Utah 1930). 
The term "arising out of11 refers to the origin or cause 
of the injury in question. Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 67 Utah 537, 248 P. 490 (Utah 1926). It must have some 
direct connection to the employment. The injury must result from 
a risk reasonably incident to the employment. A risk common to 
the public generally and not increased by the circumstances of 
the employment is not covered. Luvaul v. A. Ray Barker Motor 
Co., 384 P.2d 885 (N.M. 1963). There must be a risk or hazard 
not common to the general public or a special risk peculiar to 
the employment which caused or substantially contributed to cause 
the injury. Collins v. Combustion Engineering Co.F 490 S.W.2d 
394 (Mo. App. 1973); see also Tavey v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 
Utah 489, 150 P.2d 379, 383 (Utah 1944) (C.J. Wolfe, concurring). 
In M & K Corporation v. Industrial Commfnf 189 P.2d 132 
(Utah 1948), the court addressed the difference between "arising 
out of" and "in the course of". It compared the statute as it 
then existed to the statute's language prior to its amendment in 
1919. At the time the M & K Corporation case was decided, UCA § 
35-1-45 allowed a determination of compensability if an accident 
arose "out of or in the course of" employment. The statute had 
been amended in 1919 to read as it did at the time, M & K was 
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decided. Prior to the 1919 amendment, the statute read as it 
does today, requiring both that the accident arise out of and in 
the course of the injuredfs employment. The court then stated 
the following: 
Since the 1919 amendment to that 
section when the word "or" which we 
have italicized above was substituted 
for the word "and"f it is not necessary 
for the accident to arise both out of 
and occur in the course of his 
employment. It is sufficient that the 
accident only arises in the course of 
his employment. Workmen's compensation 
statutes both in this country and 
throughout the British empire usually 
require, as before the amendment, that 
the accident arise both out of and in 
the course of the employment, and this 
must be kept in mind in considering the 
decisions of other jurisdictions. We 
have often pointed out this distinction 
and indicated in many cases that the 
recovery was allowed on that account 
and that it probably would not have 
been allowed without the amendment. 
Tavey v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Utah 
489, 150 P.2d 379; . . . . 
189 P.2d at 134, citations omitted. Thus, the Utah court 
recognized that there was a very distinct and significant effect 
achieved by changing the single word in the statute from "and" to 
"or". The return of the legislature in 1988 to the pre-1919 
statutory language was therefore not without impact, and requires 
a showing by claimant that there was an added special risk 
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peculiar to the employment which substantially contributes to the 
injury. 
This Court recognized the additional requirements imposed 
by the amendment in Walls v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 857 P.2d 
964 (Utah App. 1993). There, the Court stated the following with 
respect to Section 35-1-45: 
In order to qualify for workers1 
compensation benefits under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-45 (1988), Walls has the burden of 
establishing: (1) that the subject injury 
occurred "in the course of" her employment", and 
(2) that the injury "arose out of" such 
employment. See Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agency, 
Inc., 606 P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 1980). Moreover, 
Walls must prove both of these requirements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Walls v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 857 P.2d at 967. 
Id. at 965. The Court then repeated that Walls, the claimant, 
"must satisfy both prongs of the test under Section 35-1-45 to 
establish compensability. . . . " Id., fn. 1. The 1988 amendment 
to Section 35-1-45 means that the legislature intended to require 
both 1) that an accident occur in the course of the claimant's 
employment, and 2) that there be an added risk from the 
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employment,3 and that these be proven by the applicant by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
B. Idiopathic Falls To Flat Surfaces Do Not 
Provide The Requisite Employment Related Risk 
Injuries arising out of risks or conditions personal to 
the claimant do not arise out of the employment unless the 
employment substantially contributes to the risk or aggravates 
the injury. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law makes it clear 
that a distinct majority of jurisdictions have denied 
compensation in level fall cases for the very reason that the 
employment adds no substantial risk. See also, e.g..Gates Rubber 
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 705 P.2d 6 (Co. App. 1985); Borden 
Foods Co. v. Dorsey. 146 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. App. 1965); Williams v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 232 N.E.2d 744 (111. 1967); Oldham v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 487 N.E.2d 693 (111. App. 1985); Luvaul v. A. 
Ray Barker Motor Co.. 384 P.2d 885 (N.M. 1963); Riley v. Oxford 
Paper Co.. 103 A.2d 111 (Maine 1954); Ledbetter v. Michigan 
Mr. Helf complains that public policy requires this Court 
to reverse the Industrial Commission, and that "if the Industrial 
Commission's decision is allowed to stand, the workers of this 
State will know that being on the job and doing their job, when 
they sustain an injury, is not enough to be afforded the 
protection of the Utah Workers Compensation Act." Brief of 
Petitioner, p. 20. That is in fact a correct statement of the 
law, as set forth by the legislature. An injury occurring only 
in the course of the employee's employment is not compensable. 
It must also arise out of the employment. This is the public 
policy established by the legislature in 1988. 
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Carton Co.. 253 N.W.2d 753 (Mich. App. 1977). The employee merely 
encounters the same risk, a flat surface beneath him, which he 
encounters everywhere. Larson's Workman's Compensation Law § 
12.1. While there are no reported decisions from the Utah Court 
of Appeals or Utah Supreme Court specifically addressing flat 
falls, our courts have accepted the idiopathic fall doctrine. 
However, those Utah cases award benefits only because the 
employee is injured by some added risk from the employment. 
In Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 675 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1983), the court affirmed an award of death benefits 
where an employee had fallen, due to a heart attack, into a tank 
of water on the employer's premises. He struck his head on the 
side of the tank and died by drowning. The court quoted 
Professor Larson in holding that the effects of an idiopathic 
fall are compensable if "the employment places the employee in a 
position increasing the dangerous effects of such a fall, such as 
on a height, near machinery or sharp corners, or in a moving 
vehicle." Kennecott Corp., 675 P.2d at 1192. (emphasis added). 
See 1A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 
In Tavey v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah 489, 150 P.2d 
379 (1944) the court relied on the idiopathic fall doctrine to 
award benefits where the employee fainted and struck her head on 
a bookshelf. Clearly, in both these Utah cases there is an added 
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element of risk which is not present here. There is no medical 
evidence in this case of increased injury from the flat cement 
surface. Those cases which have addressed the issue of flat 
surface falls have determined that there is no added risk from 
the employment, and have denied benefits. 
In Gates Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commfn, supra, the 
employee was standing, waiting for a cart to be unloaded. 
According to witnesses, the employee's feet suddenly flew out 
from under him and he fell, striking his head on the concrete 
floor of the dock area. He made no effort to catch himself as he 
fell, and one of the witnesses testified that the employee 
appeared to be having a seizure. The court found that level 
concrete surfaces such as that upon which the employee struck his 
head are "encountered on sidewalks, parking lots, streets and in 
one's home. Such a ubiquitous condition does not constitute a 
special risk of employment." Gates Rubber Co. v. Industrial 
Commfn, 705 P.2d at 7. Thus, the court found, as did the other 
courts which have been cited, that a level surface to which an 
employee falls cannot constitute a special risk of employment. 
Not only have flat fall cases been regularly held non-
compensable, but falls from certain heights have also been so 
held. Those courts have determined that falls from heights below 
certain levels do not constitute a sufficient risk that is unique 
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to the employment. Therefore, even though the falls in question 
are from a height, the added risk is not unique and therefore 
there is no additional risk arising out of the employment. 
Larson points out that the cases addressing this issue are 
approaching a "line" somewhere between 12^ inches and 18 inches. 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 12.14(a). Regardless of 
where this "line" is ultimately defined, the currently existing 
lower parameter of 12^ inches is substantially greater than the 
two inch height involved in the case at hand. 
In Hughes v. Acme Steel and Malleable Iron Works, 200 
N.Y.S.2d 185 (N.Y. 1960), an employee fell from a raised platform 
four inches higher than the level to which he struck his head. 
The claimant argued on appeal that the four inch height 
constituted an extra hazard or risk of the employment. The court 
denied the claim, stating: 
Indeed, it seems to us highly doubtful 
that an idiopathic fall from a height of 
but four inches could ordinarily present 
a factual situation which would render 
inapplicable the principle of the Andrea 
and Dasaro cases (supra) which denied 
awards for falls at ground or floor 
level, that in each case being, as here, 
to a concrete surface. 
200 N.Y.S.2d at 188. Thus, a height of four inches was 
insufficient to create an added risk. 
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Another case has held that a fall from a height of 12^ 
inches is not an added risk sufficient to meet the "arising out 
of" requirement. In Howard v. Ford Motor Company, 363 S.W.2d 61 
(Mo.App. 1962), an employer fell from a 12^ inch assembly line 
platform to a concrete floor, striking his head. The court held 
that the height was not an added risk from the employment. 
The majority rule in the idiopathic fall 
cases apparently is that the evidence 
must show a hazard connected with the 
employment not common to the general 
public or a special risk peculiar to the 
employment which caused or substantially 
contributed to cause the injuries, else 
liability does not arise. 
Does the 12^ inch drop or step-off any more nearly 
meet the requirements? Probably it does come closer 
[than a cement floor] but again we think such a 
condition is regularly met by the public and is not 
generally regarded as a real risk or hazard. A 
substantially comparable step-off is found whenever 
we walk along a street curbing or step off the 
sidewalk to cross the street. And when we go down 
two or more concrete steps from our front door to the 
sidewalk, from a place of business to the street or 
down the steps of most court houses, there is a 
potential possibility of a greater fall, and hence a 
greater hazard. 
Therefore, a height of at least 12^ inches has been held 
insufficient to create an added risk attributable to the 
employment. The Administrative Law Judge found that at the time 
of Mr. Helffs fall, the plate on which he was standing was only 
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two inches above the loading dock on which he fell. This finding 
was adopted by the Industrial Commission. The testimony of Nick 
Valles, a witness to the incident, indicated that the end of the 
platform on which applicant stood was nearly settled onto the 
trailer, and that there was only a two inch difference in height 
between the platform and the loading dock. (R. 170-171). This 
was also consistent with a statement made by Mr. Valles 
immediately after the injury occurred. (R. 45). This two inch 
height is well under the 12^ inch height considered by the courts 
to be insignificant. In addition, absolutely no medical evidence 
was provided by Mr. Helf to indicate that this two inch height 
increased his injury or risk of injury. To the contrary, Dr. 
John Barbuto stated that he can find no data which would indicate 
to a reasonable certainty that the additional height of the plate 
contributed to any measurable degree to Mr. Helf's injury. (R. 
47). Thus, the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge and 
the Industrial Commission that there was no added risk special to 
the employment in this case is supported by substantial evidence 
and the law. 
The hardness or softness of the surface to which an 
employee falls in a level fall case does not constitute a special 
risk of employment. In Zuchowski v. US Rubber Co., 229 A.2d 61 
(R.I. 1967), the Rhode Island supreme court addressed a flat fall 
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case where the employee landed on a cement floor. The court 
stated the following regarding the nature of the floor to which 
the employee fell. 
The fact that the floor where petitioner 
fell was cement does not, in our opinion 
supply the necessary element of special 
risk which would make his injuries 
compensable. Floors of all nature and 
kind are a normal and customary part of 
one's life, be one at home or work. We 
do not believe that the composition of 
the floor in and of itself should be the 
determining factor as to whether there is 
a special risk incident present in one's 
employment. Such a criterion would send 
this court into the endless wilds of 
speculation. As pointed out in Riley v. 
Oxford Paper Co., supra, one could fall 
heavily on a cement floor without injury, 
where another might fall on soft sand and 
break a wrist. The workmen's 
compensation act does not provide that 
every workman who is injured while in his 
place of employment shall be compensated 
for his injury. We cannot accept the 
contention that a level floor made of 
cement or other hard substance in a place 
of one's employment is a special risk not 
encountered on a sidewalk, parking lot or 
one's home where a similar surface 
exists. 
229 A.2d at 65. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine also reached the same 
conclusion in Riley v. Oxford Paper Co.. 103 A.2d 111 (Me. 1954). 
In that case the decedent was walking along a loading platform at 
his place of work when he fell. Witnesses stated that he clasped 
both hands to his left side, cried out and then slumped sideways, 
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striking his face on the platform. The court found that the fall 
was idiopathic in nature, and determined that level floor falls 
add no special risk from the employment. 
As was stated in Dasaro v. Ford Motor 
Co.. 280 App. Div. 266, 113 N.Y.S.2d 413, 
415, "the ground below is a universal and 
normal boundary on one side of life. In 
any epileptic fit anywhere, the ground or 
the floor would end the fall." It is 
true that a hard floor may enhance an 
injury, but in varying degrees all floors 
are hard. All places of employment must 
have floors, be such floors only the hard 
packed soil of mother earth. We do not 
care to undertake the confusing task of 
determining from case to case when a 
floor is hard enough to constitute an 
appreciable risk or hazard and when not. 
One might fall heavily upon the cement 
floor without injury, while another might 
fall upon soft sand and break a wrist. 
We feel that the test of "hardness" of 
the floor too readily lends itself to a 
reductio ad absurdum. 
103 A.2d at 113, 114. Thus, the reasoning of the majority of 
jurisdictions clearly rejects considering the hardness of the 
surface to which an employee falls in level fall cases. See 
Ledbetter v. Michigan Carton Co., supra; Remington v. Louttit 
Laundry Co., 74 A.2d 442 (R.I. 1950); Oldham v. Industrial 
Comm'n, supra; Kraynick v. Industrial Comm'n. 148 NW.2d 668 
(Wisconsin 1967); Luvaul v. A. Ray Barker Motor Co., supra. In 
cases where an employee falls to a level floor or surface, the 
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hardness of the floor is simply not considered in determining 
whether a special risk or hazard existed. 
C. The Unexplained Pall Theory Is Inapplicable To This 
Matter. 
Mr. Helf claims that if his idiopathic fall was not 
caused by his heart condition, he is entitled to workers1 
compensation benefits under the unexplained fall doctrine. This 
argument is without merit. A fall which is caused by a syncopal 
episode (loss of consciousness or faint) is not an unexplained 
fall. This is true even if the exact reason for the syncopal 
episode is unknown. 
The case of Oldham v. Industrial Comm'n of Illinois, 
supra, was decided on facts very similar to the present case. In 
that case, the applicant sustained a head injury when she fell at 
work. A witness testified that he saw the applicant "go rigid 
like a board" and fall backwards, "toppling over" and striking 
her head on a clay tile floor. There was no evidence that the 
applicant slipped or that the floor was not clean and dry. The 
attending neurosurgeon stated that the applicant "had suffered a 
syncope attack of unknown etiology." He explained that this 
meant that she suffered from a faint or transient loss of 
consciousness for unknown reasons. The Court ruled that the fall 
was not an unexplained fall, stating: "While the reason for the 
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syncope is unknown, the reason for the fall was the syncope 
itself." 487 N.E.2d 694. The Court went on to hold that the 
clay tile floor did not constitute a heightened risk. Benefits 
were denied accordingly. 
A similar result was reached by the Michigan Court of 
Appeals in the case of Ledbetter, supra. In that case, an 
employee was standing in a locker room when he suddenly began 
shaking and foaming at the mouth, turned completely stiff, and 
fell to the floor. The decedent did not attempt to break his 
fall. His head hit directly onto the concrete floor. The 
decedent's shaking and subsequent fall were observed by two 
witnesses. 
In rejecting the unexplained fall claim, the Court 
stated: 
While this court firmly believes in the 
principle that employers should be 
responsible for work-related injuries of 
their employees, we do not feel that such 
responsibilities should be stretched to 
include injuries predominantly personal 
to the employee. 
In the present case the decedent's fall 
must be termed idiopathic in nature. . . 
The seizure and fall was witnessed by 
two other employees. This matter cannot 
therefore be considered as one dealing 
with falls of unexplained or unknown 
origin. 
253 N.W.2d 753, 756. 
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The Court also rejected the argument that the composition 
of the concrete floor aggravated the injury. 
Although we recognize that a fall onto a 
softer surface may have lessened the 
impact, we are not convinced that the 
composition of the floor necessarily 
aggravated the harm. It cannot be said 
with certainty that had the fall occurred 
at a different location, away from the 
employer's premises, the injuries would 
have been any less serious. 
Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon reached a similar result 
in the case of McAdams v. Saif Corporation, 474 P.2d 80 (Or. App. 
1984) . In that case, an applicant suffered a posterior skull 
fracture from striking his head on the floor. His treating 
physician testified that the applicant had suffered a spontaneous 
fainting spell but was unable to determine the cause, despite 
extensive testing. The Court rejected the unexplained fall 
theory, stating: "Here, the cause of the fall was also known, he 
fainted." 674 P.2d 80. Benefits were denied. 
There is no doubt in this case that Mr. Helf's fall was 
caused by an idiopathic syncopal episode. Two witnesses observed 
the fall. The medical records refer to the fall as syncopal. 
(Exhibit D-l, pp. 155, 207). The witnesses1 description of the 
fall makes it clear that it was syncopal in nature. 
While Mr. Helf was standing on the plate, 
his hands went down to his sides, he went 
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rigid, jerked back, and fell straight 
back hitting his head on the flat cement 
floor of the loading dock. When Mr. Helf 
fell, he did not call out or make any 
other sound. He did not attempt to break 
his fall with his hands. He was 
unconscious before he hit the floor. 
(Finding of Fact No. 5.) 
Because the fall was witnessed and was due to a syncopal 
episode, the unexplained doctrine does not apply. There is no 
evidence whatsoever that the applicant slipped or tripped or that 
there was any other external or environmental cause for his fall. 
There is no medical evidence whatsoever that the fall was caused 
by Mr. Helf's employment activities. The Administrative Law 
Judge and Industrial Commission were correct in finding that the 
Mr. Helffs fall was caused by an idiopathic syncopal episode and 
that neither the composition of the cement loading dock or the 
fact that dock plate was two inches higher than the dock floor 
increased the risk of injury sufficiently to cause this claim to 
arise out of Mr. Helf's employment. 
Mr. Helf argues that Utah should adopt the reasoning of 
the Arizona courts in Circle K Store No. 1131 v. Industrial 
Comm'n.. 165 Ariz. 91, 796 P.2d 893 (Ariz. 1990). There, the 
court determined that in an unexplained fall case, the burden is 
not on the employee to prove that his injury arose out of his 
employment. It based its decision on its adoption of the 
positional risk theory: 
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The positional-risk doctrine has been adopted by 
various jurisdictions under the reasoning that 
employees on the job and performing duties for 
their employers, should be compensated for 
injuries occurring in the course thereof. 
Id. at 898. According to the Arizona court, when an employee is 
injured "in the course of employment" by some neutral force 
"neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with 
the employment," the injury will be presumed to arise out of the 
employment. Id. This court should not adopt the Arizona rule 
for two reasons. First, it need not even address the issue in 
this case. The evidence is overwhelming that Mr. Helf fell 
because of a condition personal to him. He fainted and did so in 
front of two witnesses. Thus, the unexplained fall theory does 
not apply. 
Second, even in the case of an unexplained fall, Utah's 
legislature has clearly stated that a party must prove both that 
his injury occurred in the course of employment, and that it 
arose out of his employment. There is no room under the 
statute's plain language for a court to adopt the Arizona 
presumption theory. This state has recently moved away from a 
single rule of "in the course of employment." This court has 
held that it is Mr. Helf's burden to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that his injury also arose out of his employment. 
Walls v. Industrial Comm'n., supra. 
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Therefore, if this were an unexplained fall, the employee 
must still meet his burden of proof.4 
The Administrative Law Judge correctly found that 
Mr. Helf's fall was not unexplained, but due to a syncopal 
episode personal to him and unrelated to his work activities. 
Accordingly, the Industrial Commission's orders should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Respondent Yellow Freight 
System, Inc. respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
order of the Industrial Commission. 
Dated this 14th day of February, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
David M. McConkie 
Stuart F. Weed 
Attorneys for Respondent Yellow 
Freight System, Inc. 
4See e.g., Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Martin, 417 So.2d 199 (Ala. 
App.1981); McClain v. Chrysler Corp., 138 Mich.App. 723, 360 
N.W.2d 284 (1984); Wheaton v. Reiser Co.. 419 S.W.2d 497 
(Mo.App.1967); Eggers v. Industrial Comm'n, 157 Ohio St. 70, 104 
N.E.2d 681 (1952); Grassel v. Garde Mfg. Co.. 90 R.I. 1, 153 A.2d 
527 (1959). 
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David M. McConkie (A2154) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Employer 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAVELL H. HELF, : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Claimant, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
: AND ORDER 
vs. : 
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC 
Employer. : 
: Case No. 93-20 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Timothy C. 
Allen, on the 7th day of July, 1993. Applicant, Lavell Helf, was present and was 
represented by attorney, Hans Scheffler. Employer, Yellow Freight System, Inc., was 
represented by attorney David M. McConkie. The Administrative Law Judge, having 
considered the testimony presented at the hearing and having reviewed the exhibits and 
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file herein, and good cause appearing, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 9, 1992, Lavell H. Helf was employed as a truck driver by 
Yellow Freight System, Inc., in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. On September 9, 1992, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Mr. Helf arrived at 
Gates Rubber Company in Salt Lake City, Utah to pick up a shipment for his 
employer, Yellow Freight System, Inc. 
3. While standing on the Gate Rubber Company loading dock, Mr. Helf 
bent over and pulled up on a metal ring which released a spring-loaded metal dock 
plate, causing the plate to raise and extend to the back of the trailer. 
4. It took minimal exertion to pull the ring and release the dock plate (less 
than 20 pounds) and Mr. Helf did not have any problem pulling the ring. 
5. After pulling the ring, Mr. Helf walked onto the plate toward his trailer. 
While Mr. Helf was standing on the plate, his hands went down to his sides, he went 
rigid, jerked back, and fell straight back hitting his head on the flat cement floor of the 
loading dock. When Mr. Helf fell, he did not call out or make any other sound. He 
did not attempt to break his fall with his hands. He was unconscious before he hit the 
floor. 
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6. The dock plate on which Mr. Helf was standing at tlje time of his fall 
• r 
• c 
• • t c 
was two inches higher than the surface of the loading dock. 
7. Mr. Helf was injured when his head hit the flat surface of the loading 
dock. 
8. For several years prior to his fall, Mr. Helf received medical treatment 
for a heart condition diagnosed as idiopathic hypertrophic subaortic stenosis. 
9. Mr. Helf s fall was caused by an idiopathic syncopal episode of unknown 
origin. The fall was not caused by any external cause related to the dock plate or by 
any other external cause such as tripping, slipping, etc. 
10. The syncopal episode which resulted in Mr. Helf s fall was not related 
to his pre-existing heart condition. 
11. Mr. Helf s injury coincidentally occurred at work because of his 
idiopathic condition without any enhancement from the workplace. Prior to and at the 
time of his syncopal episode and fall, Mr. Helf was not engaged in any activity which 
created any strain, exertion, or stress greater than that of his normal nonemployment 
life or the normal nonemployment life of any other person. His syncopal episode and 
injury did not result from any strain, exertion, or stress related to his employment. 
12. Mr. Helf s employment did not contribute anything to increase the risk 
of injury that he or any other worker normally faces in everyday life. Neither the 
composition of the cement loading dock nor the fact that the dock place was two 
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inches higher than the dock floor increased the risk of injury ;tha& Mr. Helf or the 
» 
average worker normally faces in everyday nonemployment life. JVlr. "Helf s employment 
did not increase the dangerous effects of his fall. 
13. Mr. Helf failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was 
injured, by accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment with-the 
employer, Yellow Freight System, Inc. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Mr. Helf was not injured by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment with his employer. 
2. Neither Mr. Helf s employment nor any activities related thereto were 
the legal cause or medical cause of his injury. 
3. The "unexplained fall" doctrine is not applicable to the facts of this case 
inasmuch as Mr. Helf had a syncopal episode which caused the fall. 
4. Mr. Helf is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits as set forth in 
§ 35-1-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann. 
ORDER 
The Administrative Law Judge, having made and entered his Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in the above entitled matter, and good cause appearing 
therefor, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that this matter be and 
the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
• » • 
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail 
the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and 
not subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is timely filed, the 
parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the date of filing with the Commission, in 
which to file a written response with the Commission in accordance with § 63-
46(b)(12)(2), Utah Code Ann. 
DATED this / y L d a y of August, 1993. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on August lo^K 1993, a copy of the 
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the 
case of Lavell H. Helf, was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Lavell H. Helf 
4916 Cherry Wood Lane 
West Valley UT 84120 
Hans Scheffler 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State Street Suite 380 
SLC, UT 84111 
David M. McConkie 
Attorney at Law 
Kirton, McConkie & Poelman 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
SLC, UT 84111-1004 
Karen Tolbert 
Adjuster 
Yellow Freight System, Inc. 
P 0 Box 7932 
Overland Park, KS 66207 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By u ) ^H fa/MK/A^n \ff\ 
Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication Division 
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Tab 2 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF JTAH,!r \ 
LAVELL HELF, * 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
vs. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC- * Case No. 93-0020 
(Self-Insured), * 
Defendant. * 
Lavell H. Helf asks the Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review an Administrative Law Judge's Order denying benefits under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Commission exercises jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah 
Administrative Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact set forth in the 
ALJ's Order of August 12, 1993. A summarization of those facts 
follows: 
For several years prior to the incident in question, Mr. Helf 
suffered from episodes of unexplained loss of consciousness, known 
as "syncope" in medical terminology. Such episodes occurred 
randomly and were not related to any particular activity or 
situation. 
On September 9, 1993, Mr. Helf was employed as a truck driver 
for Yellow Freight. While preparing to load freight into his 
trailer, he experienced another syncopal episode. Witnesses report 
that Mr. Helf toppled backward, with no effort to break his fall. 
He was apparently unconscious by the time he fell to the flat 
surface of the loading dock. 
Mr. Helf's exertions at work on September 9, 1993 were no 
greater than those of his nonemployment life, nor were his 
exertions greater than customarily experienced by average 
individuals in normal every day life. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation to 
workers who are injured by accident "arising out of and in the 
course of" their employment. (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45.) It is the 
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worker's burden to prove the causal relationship between his or her 
work and injury. •;• /r 
• a 
• c 
The record in this matter establishes that Mr.l&eXf suffered 
a predisposition to loss of consciousness. While there is some 
medical opinion that Mr. Helf's work activities contributed to his 
loss of consciousness on September 9, 1993, the preponderance of 
evidence establishes that Mr. Helf's work did not trigger his loss 
of consciousness. 
Because Mr. Helf's loss of consciousness and resulting fall 
were the result of a condition peculiar to Mr. Helf himself, the 
injuries that he sustained in the fall are not a consequence of his 
employment. 
As noted in Commissioner Carlson's dissent, an accident not 
directly caused by employment may nonetheless be compensable if the 
danger of injury is enhanced by the conditions of employment. In 
this case, Mr. Helf's employment did not enhance his risk of 
injury. When Mr. Helf lost consciousness, he fell to the flat 
surface of the loading dock. The work environment exposed Mr. Helf 
to no more danger than would a similar fall on a sidewalk, 
driveway, or any of the other hard, flat surfaces that are common 
to everyday life. 
In light of the foregoing, we do not find a causal connection 
between Mr. Helf's injury and his employment. Because Mr. Helf's 
injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, we 
conclude the injury is not compensable under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
ORDER 
The Commission hereby affirms the Order of the Administrative 
Law Judge dated August 12, 1993. 
DATED THIS ^tf day of June, 1994. 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
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DISSENT 
r 
At the time of his injury, Mr. Helf,' was preparing to load 
additional freight into his trailer. He moved and adjusted the 
heavy freight already loaded, and then immediately performed 
maneuvers required to bring up a heavy, spring-loaded metal plate 
from the surface of the loading dock to form a ramp between the 
dock and the trailer. It was customary to lock the plate down into 
position by walking on the moving plate, which was positioned at a 
slight upward incline. While doing so, Mr. Helf suddenly fell 
backward, striking his head on the dock, and receiving severe 
injury. 
Such a fall, even if not directly caused by employment, is 
compensable if the danger of injury either before or after the fall 
is enhanced by employment activities or workplace conditions to a 
degree beyond that which would be experienced by a member of the 
general public pursuing normal everyday activities. Larson, The 
Law of Workmen's Compensation, 3-349, 3-355, 3-371 (1993). The 
general public would not have been on a loading dock, shifting 
heavy freight, and stepping onto a moving metal loading ramp. 
These circumstances distinguish Mr. Helf's accident from a fall by 
a someone standing still on a stationary, level floor, as was the 
situation in Gates Rubber v. Industrial Comm'n, 705 P.2d 6 (Co. 
App. 1985), or from a slight height, as in Hughes v. Acme Steel, 
200 N.Y. S.2d 185 (N.Y. 1960). 
A preponderance of medical opinion, i.e., from Drs. Speed, 
Null, and Freedman, concurs that Mr. Helf's injury arose out of his 
employment, that is, the fall occurred to some degree due to 
conditions of. the workplace or to physical stress and exertion 
related to the job, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45. 
Though the medical experts are not in full agreement, evidence 
indicates that the fall may have resulted from a syncopal episode, 
or loss of consciousness, that may or may not have been caused by 
a cardiac condition. It is uncontested that Mr. Helf took regular 
medication to control idiopathic.hypertrophic stenosis, a cardiac 
problem, and that he took the medication the morning of the 
accident. Mr. Helf had passed a Department of Transportation 
medical examination in 1990. 
Since everyone on the dock was engaged in other activities 
when the accident occurred, no one was giving direct attention to 
Mr. Helf when he fell. Witnesses at the evidentiary hearing 
differed about the degree of incline, though all agreed the ramp 
was somewhat inclined, about the amount of movement of the ramp, 
and about how much exertion was required to raise the platform and 
lock it into place. 
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In view of uncertain circumstances surrounding the accident, 
it is impossible to determine the cause of the fall.which resulted 
in injury. Though the majority opinion found that the fall was 
caused by a syncopal episode which was personal to the^applicant, 
Mr. Helf was in the act of performing the normal duties 'required by 
his employment when he was injured. These conclusions would 
require the issue to be resolved in favor the injured worker. 
Based on the foregoing, I would conclude that Mr. Helf's injury is 
work-related and is compensable. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
DATED THIS.^f day of June, 1994-, 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this 
Order. 
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